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Notes
SOME CHANGES IN PENNSYLVANIA LAW BY THE
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT
Pennsylvania has had its Uniform Conditional Sales
Act since the 12th of May, 1925.1 The legislature in most
respects adopted the phraseology of the Act as drawn by
Dean George Gleason of the Cornell University School of
Law. But in some of the most vital instances the Penn-
sylvania legislature failed to enact certain provisions as
formulated by the commissioners. It is the purpose of
this article to note some of the changes in the law of
Pennsylvania resulting from the adoption of the Act in
1925, and also to note the changes made in the Uniform
Act before its adoption in Pennsylvania.
Section 1 of the Act contains its most important pro-
vision; i. e., the definition of a conditional sale and the
meaning of the other leading words used throughout the
act. It is in this section that the Pennsylvania legislature
made its most illogical and regrettable move. As drawn by
the commissioners this section provided the following:
"Section 1-DEFINITION OF TERMS:-In this
act 'conditional sale' means (1) any contract for the
sale of goods under which possession is delivered to
the buyer and the property in the goods is to vest in
the buyer at a subsequent time upon the payment of
part or all of the price, or upon the performance of
any other condition or the happening of any conting-
ency; or (2) any contract for the bailment or leasing
of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to
pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to
the value of the goods, and by which it is agreed that
the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the
1Aot of May 12, 1925, P. L. 603.
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option of becoming the owner of such goods upon the
full compliance with the terms of the contract".3
In adopting section 1 the Pennsylvania legislature
omitted subsection 2.' At the time it was stated that this
section would work too sudden a change in existing Penn-
sylvania law in relation to bailment leases, yet subsection
1 caused an even greater change in the pre-existing law of
conditional sales. A primary purpose of the commissioners
was defeated when subsection 2 was omitted. By includ-
ing contracts of bailment or leasing of goods under the
definition of a conditional sale it was hoped by the com-
missioners to abolish the many differences which have de-
veloped between the law of conditional sales and that of
bailment leases, particularly in states like Pennsylvania.
This advance step promulgated in the uniform draft was
cast aside by the legislature, with the result that the law
in Pennsylvania in regard to bailment leases has under-
gone no direct change by reason of our Conditional Sales
act. Since the cases in Pennsylvania on conditional sales
and bailment leases before 1925 are in inextricable con-
fusion the omission of subsection 2 is deplorable. Such a
provision would have aided in clarifying Pennsylvania law
in reference to the particular phase.
Prior to and since 1925 the decisions in Pennsylvania
have failed to make any clear cut distinction between con-
ditional sales and bailment leases. What might be ruled
to be a conditional sale. in one case has often been held to
be a bailment lease in a succeeding case by the same court.
This situation has been complicated by the fact. that it has
22 U. L. A. No. 1, p. 2. As to what constitutes a conditional sale
see also 17 A. L. R. 1421; 27 Mich. Law Rev. 591; 8 Minn. Law Rev.
162; Williston on Sales p. 324 et seq.
5See Act May 12, 1925, P. L. 603, sec. 1; and Stern v. Paul, 96
Pa. Super. Ct. 112 (1928), in which the court, at page 117, stated:
"although not conclusive, this action of the legislature (in omitting
subsection 2) is strongly persuasive in favor of the view that it was
deemed unwise to make any change in the existing law relative to
bailment leases",
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always been important to determine whether a particular
set of facts constituted one or the other, for, due to a well
settled rule of law peculiar to Pennsylvania, the separation
of title and possession in conditional sales was fraudulent
per se,4 and, therefore, one who made delivery under a con-
ditional sale contract was estopped to claim title as against
innocent purchasers for value from or levying creditors of
the conditional buyer, though in most jurisdictions the con-
trary was and is the law.5 But one who makes delivery
under a bailment lease, whether there be an option to
purchase or not, has always been protected against in-
nocent purchasers for value or levying creditors of the
bailee.6
The first decision of the Supreme Court relative to a
conditional sale was that of Martin v. Mathiot.7  In this
case Chief Justice Tilghman, in holding that a condition
reserving title in the vendor until full payment of the
purchase price while good and enforceable as between the
original parties, was unenforceable against creditors of or
innocent purchasers for value from a conditional vendee,
said:
"The cases which have generally been brought be-
fore the courts of justice, are those in which the sell-
er has remained in possession, those having been ad-
judged fraudulent. There are innumerable authorities
on this subject, but I will refer particularly to Clow
v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 286, and Babb v. Clemson, 10 S. &
R. 419.. . .The principle which governed them, was
that a sale, where possession does not accompany and
follow it, is fraudulent as to the creditors. It was the
separation of the possession from the property which
624 R. C. L. 449, 450.
5J. P. McKeehan: Effect of Uniform Sales Act on Pre-Existing
Law in Pennsylvania, 26 *Dick. Law Rev. 151, 161.
ORowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. 26 (1865); Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 488
(1875); Ditman v. Cottrell, 125 Pa. 606 (1889); Miller v. Douglas, 32
Pa. Super. Ct. 158 (1906); Reading Auto Co. v. De Haven, 53 Pa.
Super. Ct. 344 (1913).
114 S. & R. 214 (1826).
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made the fraud; and the principle applies to the case
before us. Here the seller did not retain the posses-
sion but was to retain the property after he had trans-
ferred possession to the buyer. The mischief is the
same-a false credit is given; and whether given to a
buyer or seller, is immaterial . . . . It is the rule of gen-
eral policy which declares possession to be the evidence
of pioperty, and the presumption is, that every man is
trusted according to the property in his possession".
In the Martin case a creditor of the buyer had levied on
goods in the buyer's possesion under a conditional sale
contract.
With such an eminent authority as Justice Tilghman
pointing out the policy of the Pennsylvania courts against
secret liens and interests arising from the separation of
title and possession, an imposing array of decisions in
Pennsylvania has refused to uphold the validity of con-
ditional sales as against bona fide purchasers or incum-
brancers for value or subsequent levying creditors of the
buyer.8
There is no question but that the law as enunciated in
Martin v. Mathiot. was harsh, and Justice Dean in Keystone
Watch Co. v. Fourth Street National Bank' made note of this.
"Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. 190 (1845); Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. 499
(1870); Stadfeld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. 53 (1879); Thompson v. Paret,
94 Pa. 275 (1880); Brunswick Co. v. Hoover, 95 Pa. 508 (1880); Peek
v. Heim, 127 Pa. 500 (1889); Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219 (1890);
Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. 233 (1891); Ott v. Sweatman, 166 Pa.
217 (1895); Schmalz v. York Mfg. Co., 204 Pa. 1 (1902); Duplex
Printing Co. v. Clipper Co., 213 Pa. 207 (1906); Schmidt v. Bader, 284
Pa. 41 (1925); Deere Plow Co. v. Hershey, 287 Pa. 92 (1926), in which
the sale occurred and the controversy involved was in litigation prior
to the passage of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act of 1925. An ap-
parent exception to the above line of cases is Bank v. Motor Car Co.,
235 Pa. 194 (1912); but see comment on this case in Hawk v. Frey,
228 Fed. 779 (E. D. Pa.-1916). For a softening of the rigor of the
Pennsylvania rule concerning separation of title and possession see
Justice Sadler's opinion in Shipler v. New Casile Paper Corp., 293
Pa. 412, 421 (1928).
9Supra.
10194 Pa. 535 (1900).
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Inasmuch as the courts themselves recognized the rigor of
this rule, it was to be expected that they would invariably
hold doubtful cases to be bailment leases and not condition-
al sales.1 Many cases which on their facts were in reality
conditional sales in all but name were held not to be con-
ditional sales, but, on the contrary, to be bailment leases. 2
Thus by the expedient of calling the contract a "lease"
and providing for the payment of "rent", many sellers
avoided the rigor of the conditional sale rule in Pennsyl-
vania prior to 1925. Whenever the amount of rent con-
tracted to be paid is equal substantially to the value of the
goods and the buyer is to become the owner after all the
rent is paid or has the option to become the owner by pay-
ing a nominal sum after the last installment has been paid,
the courts ought to disregard the form and consider the
transaction to be a conditional sale.' 3 If the buyer promises
to pay all the installments, the aggregate of which is equiv-
alent substantially to the value of the goods, there should
be no doubt of the transaction being a conditional sale.
"Muller: Conditional Sales in Pennsylvania Since the Uniform
Sales Act, 72 U. Pa. Law Rev. 123, 146.
12Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. 26 (1865); Becker v. Smith, 59 Pa. 469
(1868); Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 488 (1875); Ditman v. Cottrell, 125 Pa.
606 (1889); Lippincott v. Scott, 198 Pa. 283 (1901); Stiles v. Seaton,
200 Pa. 114 (1901); Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Strang, 215 Pa. 475
(1906); Link Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 227 Pa. 37 (1910); Jones
v. Wands, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 269 (1896); Porter v. Duncan, 23 Pa. Super.
Ct. 58 (1903); Miller v. Douglas, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 158 (1906); Reading
Auto Co. v. De Haven, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 344 (1913). Due to the hold-
ings by the courts of transactions which are in reality conditional
sales to be contracts of bailment, there has been developed what is
known in other jurisdictions as the "Pennsylvania Rule". This is,
that in Pennsylvania, if a party receives possession of goods under
an agreement that he is to retain them for a definite period of time,
and if, at or before the expiration of that period, he pays for them,
he is to become the owner,-otherwise to pay for the use of them,-
this constitutes a bailment ,and title to the property even as against
creditors remains in the bailor: 17 A. L. R. 1421, 1441.
-3 Williston on Sales, p. 336, and cases cited under note 66; 36
Harv. Law Rev. 489.
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Despite language to the contrary in Ott v. Sweatman,1"4
many Pennsylvania cases look only to the form of the
transaction in determining whether the transaction is a
conditional sale or a bailment lease.
1 5
It is to be remembered that a bailment fease con-
templates only the use of the property for a specified
period, at the end of which it is to return to the lessor, un-
less there is an option to buy which is exercised. The in-
stallments or rent should compensate for the use and de-
terioration of the property, and the amount mentioned in
the option to buy should approximate the actual value of
the property, rather than be a mere nominal sum. On the
other hand, a conditional sale anticipates the ultimate as-
sumption of ownership by the conditional buyer plus the
right to intermediate use. If there is anywhere in the
agreement a promise on the part of the buyer to pay a
certain number of installments the aggregate of which
equals the value of the goods there should be a conditional
sale, but many Pennsylvania cases hold the contrary.
Perhaps the most notorious case in which a seller,
desirous of making a conditional sale, yet anxious to avoid
the Pennsylvania law prior to 1925, resorted to the device
of making the contract in the form of a lease with an
option to the buyer to purchase for a small consideration
provided all the so-called "rent" were paid, is that of the
Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Strang.16 In this case, the plain-
tiff leased to the defendant a quantity of rails together
with a steam shovel and a number of dump cars. The
stated rent, payable in installments, amounted to over six
thousand dollars. The contract stated that if the defendant
paid all the rent installments as they became due, the de-
fendant would then have the option of purchasing said
14166 Pa. 217, 221 (1895), ruling that Pennsylvania courts will con-
strue the essential character of the contract rather than its form.
See also Hays v. Weikel & Marks, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 465 (1921).
"5Brown Bros. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76 (1894); Stiles v. Seaton,
200 Pa. 114 (1901); Re Morris, 156 Fed. 597 (M. D. Pa.-1907); Cin-
cinnati Equipment Co. v. Strang, 215 Pa. 475 (1906).




goods and of becoming the owner thereof on the payment
of the trifling sum of ten dollars. Nothing could be more
obvious than the fact that the ten dollars provision and
the provision for rent were mere devices, yet the Supreme
Court ruled that the transaction was a bailment lease with
option to purchase. This conclusion resulted from merely
viewing the form of the contract rather than grasping its
essential nature which clearly was that of a conditional
sale. 17
It is therefore readily apparent that despite the fact
that the Pennsylvania courts have often stated the proposi-
tion that the reservation of title after delivery of the goods
as security for the price in a conditional sale is unenforce-
able against creditors of and innocent purchasers for value
from the conditional buyer, yet as a practical matter the
courts have been enforcing the condition reserving title
in the seller by the expedient of holding such contracts to
be bailnent contracts rather than contracts of conditional
sale."8
Subsection 2 of Section 1 of the commissioner's draft
would have precluded the further arising of such expedients
and subterfuges. This subsection by including bailment
lease contracts within the operation of the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act would have made the law uniform, and
an effective protection would have been given against secret
conditional sales no matter what their form. But, as noted,
the Pennsylvania legislature emasculated section 1 by omit-
ting subsection 2.
With the omission of said subsection the present situ-
ation in Pennsylvania amounts to this. All conditional sales
to be effective as against innocent third persons must be
recorded. But there are a great number of situations in
17See Williston on Sales, p. 336, note 67, for a criticism of the
Strang case. For cases in which so called "leases" have been held
to be contracts of conditional sale see Kelly Roller Co. v. Spyker,
215 Pa. 332 (1906); Weiss v. Lichter, 113 N. Y. S. 999 (1909); Smith
v. Aldrich, 180 Mass. 367 (1902); Lauter v. Isenra-th, 72 AtI. 56 (N.
J.-1909).
1872 U. Pa. Law Rev. 147.
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which it is doubtful whether the transaction is a contract
of conditional sale or one of bailment. In such cases pre-
sumably the Pennsylvania courts will continue their past
tendency of indirectly protecting the rights of the seller
in such cases and will therefore construe questionable cases
as contracts of bailment rather than conditional sales.
But they might not do this. Therefore, the careful prac-
titioner, in doubtful cases, would do well to record the
transaction. If it turns out to be a contract of conditional
sale, all well and good. If it is decided to be a bailment
lease, nothing has been lost but the payment of trivial
filing fees. In drawing up a bailment lease, with or with-
out option to purchase, it is best to follow closely the lan-
guage of such contracts declared to be valid bailment leases
in Supreme Court decisions. The same would apply to
the making of conditional sale contracts.
Besides the omission of subsection 2 there were other
changes made in section 1 of the Conditional Sales Act
before its enactment in Pennsylvania.1
Section 2 of the Act gives the buyer the right to pos-
session when he is not in default and it also gives him the
right to the title in the goods upon performance of the
condition. The buyer's remedies are governed by the Uni-
19(1) Pa. Act omits the words "or hires" in the definition of
buyer. (2) Pa. Act omits the words "or leases" in the definition of
seller. (3) Pa. Act changed the first clause in the definition of goods
to read: "Goods means all chattels personal, other than things in
action and money and machinery attached to or to be attached to
real estate". It is to be noted in this connection that Pennsylvania
had a separate statute (Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 722) "concerning
conditional sales of chattels attached, or to be attached, to realty, and
regulating the filing and effect thereof". However, in 1927 the legis-
lature by the Act of May 12, 1927, P. L. 979, repealed the Act of May
14, 1925, P. L. 722, and amended the definition of goods in the first
section of the Act of May 12, 1925, P. L. 603, by eliminating the
words "and machinery attached to or to be attached to real estate".
The net result of these statutory changes is to include machinery at-
tached to or to be attached to real estate under the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act of 1925, P. L. 603, as amended. See Beloit Iron
Works v. Lockhart, 294 Pa. 376 (1928), in litigation before the pass-
age of the Act of May 12, 1927, P. L. 979.
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form Sales Act. 20 A conditional buyer can rescind the con-
tract under the Uniform Sales Act.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of
Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pennsylvania Brick and Tile
Co., 22 said:
"It will be further noted that the Sales Act did
not purport to deal with conditional sales, which were
made the subject of a separate uniform law, adopted
by the commissioners the same year though not enact-
ed as a statute in this state until 1925 (May 12, P. L.
603)".
Such a statement is inaccurate, for the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act does not cover all the law of conditional
sales, while on the other hand, the Sales Act does apply in
many instances, except of course where there are factual
differences preventing due to the separation of title and
possession inherent in a conditional sale. In fact section
2 2 (a) of the Uniform Sales Act specifically deals with the
risk of loss in conditional sales. The commissioners of the
Conditional Sales Act, in their Commentaries on'the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act frequently make reference to
the Uniform Sales Act as applying to cases which the Con-
ditional Sales Act does not cover.23
Section 3 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act pro-
vides that the buyer is liable to the seller for the purchase
price or installments as they become due. There are two
principal remedies open to the unpaid seller. He can sue
for the price under section 63 (2) of the Uniform Sales
Act,24 or retake the goods, 2 5 or both. 26 The unpaid sellei
2OAct of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543.
-"Russo v. Lavender, 215 N. Y. S. 642 (1926). See also article by
Vold on the Divided Property Interest in Conditional Sales, 78 U.
Pa. Law Rev. 713: and the Effect of the Uniform Sales Act on Rights
of Purchaser from Conditional Buyer, 39 Harv. Law Rev. 660.
22292 Pa. 86 (1928).
2flNotes in 2 U. L. A. No. 2; 2A U. L. A. p. 45; 2 U. L. A. p. 41.
24Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543. See also Remedies of Seller
in Conditional Sales, 36 Harv. Law Rev. 481.
25Section 16, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, infra.
26Section 24, ibid.
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in a recorded conditional sale can also bring trover or
replevin as against third persons. 27 However, under section
63 (3) of the Uniform Sales Act,2 18 where there is a con-
ditional sale of goods having a ready market, if the con-
ditional buyer has agreed to pay the price only upon the
condition that the property in the goods be passed to him
and the buyer refuses to accept the goods and take title, it
has been held that the conditional seller cannot tender the
goods, force the title on the buyer and collect the price.
All the seller has is an action for damages for breach of
contract. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act gives the
seller no right to the price in this case and said section
63 (3) of the Sales Act limits such a right to cases where
the goods have no ready marketability.
29
The rights of a conditional seller against third persons
are the same as those of any owner of an interest in goods,
and so far as a third person converts the goods the third
person is liable for no more than the value of the goods
converted. 0
Section 4 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act makes
a conditional sale valid as to all persons except in so far as
the requirements of filing qualify it. This is a distinct
change from prior Pennsylvania law, although it is in ac-
cord with the common law of other jurisdictions. 31
In Pennsylvania8" and in most jurisdictions3 a con-
ditional sale has always been held valid as between the seller
and buyer, i. e., the parties to the transaction. But as
stated earlier, the bona fide purchaser from or creditor of
the conditional buyer has always been preferred over the
conditional seller in Pennsylvania, due to the policy of the
27Section 29, ibid.
28May 19, 1915, P. L. 543.
"gUnited Machinery Co. v. Etzel, 89 Conn. 336, 94 AtI. 356 (1915).
3ORose v. Story, I Pa. 190 (1845).
3XCarter v. Kingman, 103 Mass. 517 (1870); Fifeld v. Elmer, 25
Mich. 48 (1872); Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N. J. L. 410 (1886);
Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500 (1871); 2A U. L. A. No. 47, pp. 57, 58.
32Powell v. Clawson, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 245 (1909); Martin v.
Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (1826).
332A U. L. A. No. 46.
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courts in this state against secret liens and interests arising
from a separation of title and possession.
34
Therefore, the iesult of section 4 in Pennsylvania is to
repudiate the idea that conditional sales are subject to at-
tack on the ground of fraud or estoppel. This brings the
law of this state into line with that of the great majority
of other states in which a conditional sale is valid" as to all
persons subject to the filing requirements.
Section 5 furnishes some of the principal limitations
upon section 4 in that it provides that:
"Every provision in a conditional sale reserving
property in the seller shall be void as to any purchaser
from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of
such provisions, purchases the goods or acquires by
attachment or levy a lien on them, before the contract
or copy thereof shall be filed . . . . within ten days,
after the making of the conditional sale".
Persons who rely on the recordation of the conditional
sale are thus amply and effectively protected. The place
of filing in Pennsylvania is the prothonotary's office. 6
In making a recorded conditional sale valid as against
creditors of and purchasers from the buyer the prior law
of Pennsylvania has been radically changed. Where before
1925, innocent third persons were the ones protected, today
under a recorded conditional sale the conditional seller is
effectively protected.1 Thus by mere recording the effect
3 ,See cases cited under note 8 supra.
35See In Re Gelatt & Sons, 24 Fed. (2d) 215, (M. D. Pa.-1928), in
which a conditional sale was held valid, and title to property acquired
by bankrupts thereunder did not pass to trustee. Cf. 36 Harv. Law
Rev. 104: Property Passing to Trustee in Bankruptcy; also 39 Harv.
Law Rev. 660: Effect of Uniform Sales Act on Rights of Purchasers
from Conditional Buyers.
36Section 7, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, infra.
37Riccardi Motor Car Co. v. Weinstein, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 41
(1929); Anchor Concrete Machinery Co. v. Pa. Brick & Tile Co.,
292 Pa. 86, 92 (1928). As to necessity for filing trust receipt of con-
ditional sale see 39 Harv. Law Rev. 658; 40 Ibid. 658. A case note on,
When Is a Record of a Conditional Sale Not a Record nor Even a
Notice, is to be found in 28 Mich. Law Rev. 351. For Sufficiency of
Description in Filing see 16 Va. Law Rev. 96.
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of the long line of cases beginning with Martin v. Mathiot
is overcome; the seller being directly favored by the act.
But it is important to note that in Pennsylvania goods
in the possession of a conditional buyer under a recorded
conditional sale contract are not exempt from distress for
rent, on the theory that the landlord's lien is of common
law origin and is unaffected by the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, which in no way purports to deal with a land-
lord's lien.
38
Section 6 provides that the place of filing shall be in
the prothonotary's office in the county in which the goods
are first kept for use by the buyer after the sale. 9 It is
not a condition precedent to filing that the conditional sale
contract be acknowledged or attested.
Section 7, relating to fixtures (i. e., goods which are to
be or are attached to land), provided that in conditional
sales of fixtures, where the parties intended that the fix-
tures should keep their character as personalty, it was
necessary in order to be valid against innocent third per-
sons to record such a contract in the office of the recorder
of deeds, this type of notice reaching particularly dealers
in real property. However, the Act of May 12, 192740
repealed this section and provides that the filing of con-
ditional sales of fixtures shall take place in the prothono-
tary's office as provided for under section 6.
Section 9 provides that:
"When goods are delivered under a conditional
sale contract and the seller expressly or impliedly con-
sents that the buyer may resell them before the per-
I1obart Mfg. Co. v. Scheeren, 75 Pitts. 842 (1927); Berg v.
Langan, 14 D. & C. 159 (1930); Steinman v. Musketnuss, 14 D. & C.
743 (1931). In this conneotion see sections 30 and 32 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, whioh are the only sections which might be
relevant to this problem. See also case note on right to distrain on
goods held under conditional sale contracts in 38 Harv. Law Rev. 830.
39For conflict of laws on situs of conditionally sold property
see 26 Mich. Law Rev. 99 and 29 Harv. Law Rev. 217.
40P. L. 979, amending sections 1 and 7 of the Act of May 12,
1925, P. L. 603, and also repealing the Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 722.
See Beloit Iron Works v. Lockhart, 294 Pa. 376 (1928).
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formance of the condition, the reservation of property
shall be void against purchasers from the buyer for
value in the ordinary course of business, and as to
them the buyer shall be deemed the owner of the goods
even though the contract or a copy thereof shall be
filed".
Since the Pennsylvania courts prior to 1925 held con-
ditional sales to be void against innocent purchasers from
or creditors of the conditional buyer, it would appear by
analogy that conditional sales with the right of resale
would not have been treated with any more favor and
would have been void as against innocent third person. The
latter is the result under this section and therefore this
section somewhat approximates previous Pennsylvania law.
As the commissioners, themselves, point out, where a
seller attempts to reserve property in himself and yet al-
lows a resale by a retailer in the ordinary course of business,
he is doing two inconsistent things.41 To demand that a
purchaser from a retailer examine the records every time
he desires to make a purchase, no matter how large or
small, would clog and disrupt present economic machinery,
and therefore it is only proper that the constructive notice
obtained by filing should be of no effect insofar as a pur-
chaser from a retailer in the ordinary course of business
is concerned. But mortgagees and pledgees are not pur-
chasers in the ordinary course of business and consequently
they, as well as creditors of the retailer, are bound by
section 5 of the Act. The word retailer is used here as
synonymous with conditional buyer; e. g., a wholesale
dealer sells to a retailer under a conditional sale giving the
retailer a right to resell. Even though recorded, such a
conditional sale, as noted above, is of no effect as against
purchasers in the ordinary course of business from the re-
tailer.
Section 10 provides additional filing requirements, and
section 11 provides that the filing of the usual type of con-
ditional sale contracts shall be valid for three years. The
412 U. L. A. No. 10, commissioner's note at p. 16.
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filing of conditional sale contracts of railroad equipment or
rolling stock shall be valid for fifteen years. This section
also provides for refiling, and refiling in each case may be
extended for successive additional periods of one year each
from the date of the refiling.
Section 16 states that when the buyer is in default in
(1) the payment of any sum due under the contract or (2)
in the performance of any condition, or (3) in the perform-
ance of any promise the breach of which is by the contract
expressly made a ground for the retaking of the goods, the
seller may retake possession of the goods. Unless the
goods can be retaken without a breach of breach, they shall
be retaken by legal process. 42 This makes the right to
retake a statutory right rather than one depending upon
contractual provision.
Section 17 provides that the seller may give the buyer
twenty to forty days' notice of intention to retake, thus
giving the buyer a reasonable time to raise the payments
in arrear.
Section 18 states that after retaking, if there has been
no notice of intention to retake under section 17, the
seller must then retain the goods for ten days. It is seen
then that under either section 17 or 18 the buyer has a
period of grace during which he may perform and recover
the goods.
Sections 19 to 23 provide what is to be done with the
goods after the seller retakes them and under what situa-
tions the buyer is to receive back part payments or the
proceeds of a resale of the goods. If a seller retakes and
4n2 n Pennsylvania in proceedings to retake property which was
the subject of a conditional sale or bailment lease, the seller could
always retake if he could do so without force; but when the taking was
resisted he could not use force but had to proceed at law: Abel v.
Pickering Co., 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 439 (1914). The measure of damages
for wrongful retaking by a conditional seller of a machine to be
attached to realty in the hands of a receiver is its then replacement
value: Beloit Iron Works v. Lockhart, 294 Pa. 376 (1928). Replevin
is the proper remedy for enforcement of conditional sale contracts
between the original parties: Ridgway Dynamo Co. v. Werder, 287
Pa. 358 (1926).
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is so foolish as not to follow the provisions of sections 23
and 25 as to resale, the buyer may recover from the seller
his actual damage if any, and in no event less than one
quarter of the sum of all the payments with interest, which
have been made under the conditional sale contract.
Section 24 deals with the seller's election of remedies
and provides that after the retaking of possession, 3 the
buyer shall be liable for the price only after a resale.4"
Neither the bringing of an action by the seller for the re-
covery of the whole or any part of the price, nor the re-
covery of a judgment, nor the collection of part of the
price is inconsistent with the right to retake under section
16. Once the seller has collected the entire price he cannot
retake; moreover, the seller cannot retake after he has
claimed a lien on the goods or attached or levied ulion them
as the goods of the buyer.4 5 This changes the previous
Pennsylvania law on this point. Before 1925 the Supreme
Court held that the retaking of the goods by the seller con-
stituted an election which prevented him from later suing
for the purchase price.46
Section 26 provides that no agreement by the con-
ditional buyer before or at the time of the making of the
contract shall constitute a waiver of the buyer's statutory
rights. There is an exception to this rule, since the section
provides that a conditional buyer may agree to the stipu-
lation that on his default under section 16 the seller may
rescind the contract of sale. In this manner a conditional
buyer is protected from unscrupulous sellers when he most
needs protection, i. e., at or before the time the conditional
sale contract is made.
Section 27 states that the risk of loss before retaking
by the seller is on the buyer. This is the same rule as
43Section 16, Uniform Conditional Sales Act, supra.
4"Ibid, section 22. See also 29 Mich. Law Rev. 387; 29 Ibid. 528.
• Riglts and Remedies as between Parties to a Conditional Sale
after the Seller has Repossessed Himself of the Property: 37 A. L. R.
91. As to bringing action for price as waiver of right to reclaim the
property see 12 A. L. R. 503.
"6Kelly Springfield Roller Co. v. Schlinne, 220 Pa. 413 (1908).
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section 22 of the Uniform Sales Act. In addition, this sec-
tion provides that until the condition is fulfilled the increase
of the goods shall remain the seller's property.
Section 29 states rules for cases not provided for pre-
viously in the Act and is closely analogous to section 63
of the Uniform Sales Act.
Section 30 provides that:
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it".
All the uniform commercial acts contain this pro-
vision,4" the purpose of which is to lead Pennsylvania courts
in construing the Acts not only to follow Pennsylvania
precedents but also those of other jurisdictions.
There is no provision in the Pennsylvania Act provid-
ing for a repeal of prior inconsistent legislation correspond-
ing to section 32 of the commissioner's draft.48
Nicholas Unkovic
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES IN MURDER TRIALS
Since the Act of 1925, P. L. 759, the law in Pennsyl-
vania has been hazy and unsettled regarding the admission
of evidence of prior, unrelated crimes in the trial of a
specific offense. It has long been the established rule that
"evidence of unrelated crimes is not admissible in the trial
of a particular offense",' and this has been supported by
the Act of 1911, P. L. 20.2 As juries had been very re-
luctant to bring in a verdict of "guilty", with the death
4'Uniform Sales Act of May 19, 1915, sec. 74, P. L. 543; Uniform
Bills of Lading Act of June 9, 1911, sec. 52, P. L. 838; Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act of March 11, 1909, sec. 57, P. L. 19; Uniform
Stock Transfer Act of May 5, 1911, sec. 19, P. L. 126. See also Swift
v. Tyson, 16 Peters 1, 19, 20 (1842).
48See Section 32, 2 U. L. A. No. 32, p. 42.
'Wigmore on Evid., Vol. I, (Ed. II) Par. 193; Jamestown Iron &
Metal Co., v. Knofsky, 154 Atl. 15 (Pa. 1931); Comm. v. Jones, 280
Pa. 368 (1924); Comm. v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1 (1898).
4Sec. 1, 19 P. S. sec. 711, p. 147.
